

(b) ELEMENTS.—The assessment required by subsection (a) shall include descriptions of—

(1) the current level of counter-UAS training and equipment available to partner forces in Iraq, including in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region;

(2) the type of additional training and equipment needed to maximize the level of counter-UAS capability of partner forces in Iraq, including in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region;

(3) the availability of additional training and equipment required to maximize partner forces' counter-UAS capability;

(4) an assessment of the current and anticipated threat from UAS systems to Iraqi and coalition security forces to determine the appropriate level of requirements for counter-UAS systems and training; and

(5) any other matters the Secretary of Defense determines appropriate.

SA 4856. Mr. HAGERTY submitted an amendment intended to be proposed to amendment SA 3867 proposed by Mr. REED to the bill H.R. 4350, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2022 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:

At the end of subtitle F of title X, add the following:

SEC. 1054. JOINT DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE STUDY ON CHINESE MILITARY AND CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY INFLUENCE IN THE UNITED STATES AGRICULTURAL SUPPLY CHAIN.

(a) STUDY.—The Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of Agriculture, shall carry out a study regarding the influence of the Chinese Communist Party and the People's Liberation Army on the United States agricultural supply chain. The study shall evaluate the influence of the Chinese Communist Party and People's Liberation Army on the importation and United States domestic production of critical components used for animal feed and animal nutrition.

(b) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of Agriculture, shall submit to the congressional defense committees, the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry of the Senate, and the Committee on Agriculture of the House of Representatives a report on the results of the study conducted under subsection (a).

SA 4857. Mr. SANDERS submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill H.R. 4350, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2022 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:

At the end of section 6456, add the following:

(c) IMPROVEMENTS TO CHIPS.—Section 9902 of the William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (15 U.S.C. 4652) is amended—

(1) by redesignating subsection (c) as subsection (d); and

(2) by inserting after subsection (b) the following:

“(c) CONDITIONS OF RECEIPT.—

“(1) REQUIRED AGREEMENT.—A covered entity to which the Secretary awards Federal financial assistance under this section shall enter into an agreement that specifies that, during the 5-year period immediately following the award of the Federal financial assistance—

“(A) the covered entity will not—

“(i) repurchase an equity security that is listed on a national securities exchange of the covered entity or any parent company of the covered entity, except to the extent required under a contractual obligation that is in effect as of the date of enactment of this subsection;

“(ii) outsource or offshore jobs to a location outside of the United States; or

“(iii) abrogate existing collective bargaining agreements; and

“(B) the covered entity will remain neutral in any union organizing effort.

“(2) FINANCIAL PROTECTION OF GOVERNMENT.—

“(A) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary may not award Federal financial assistance to a covered entity under this section, unless—

“(i) (I) the covered entity has issued securities that are traded on a national securities exchange; and

“(II) the Secretary of the Treasury receives a warrant or equity interest in the covered entity; or

“(ii) in the case of any covered entity other than a covered entity described in clause (i), the Secretary of the Treasury receives, in the discretion of the Secretary of the Treasury—

“(I) a warrant or equity interest in the covered entity; or

“(II) a senior debt instrument issued by the covered entity.

“(B) TERMS AND CONDITIONS.—The terms and conditions of any warrant, equity interest, or senior debt instrument received under subparagraph (A) shall be set by the Secretary and shall meet the following requirements:

“(i) PURPOSES.—Such terms and conditions shall be designed to provide for a reasonable participation by the Secretary of Commerce, for the benefit of taxpayers, in equity appreciation in the case of a warrant or other equity interest, or a reasonable interest rate premium, in the case of a debt instrument.

“(ii) AUTHORITY TO SELL, EXERCISE, OR SURRENDER.—For the primary benefit of taxpayers, the Secretary may sell, exercise, or surrender a warrant or any senior debt instrument received under this subparagraph. The Secretary shall not exercise voting power with respect to any shares of common stock acquired under this subparagraph.

“(iii) SUFFICIENCY.—If the Secretary determines that a covered entity cannot feasibly issue warrants or other equity interests as required by this subparagraph, the Secretary may accept a senior debt instrument in an amount and on such terms as the Secretary determines appropriate.”.

SA 4858. Mr. TOOMEY (for himself and Mr. CARDIN) submitted an amendment intended to be proposed to amendment SA 3867 proposed by Mr. REED to the bill H.R. 4350, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2022 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:

At the end of title XII, add the following:

Subtitle H—Iran Sanctions

SEC. 1291. SHORT TITLE.

This subtitle may be cited as the “Masih Alinejad Harassment and Unlawful Targeting Act of 2021” or the “Masih Alinejad HUNT Act”.

SEC. 1292. FINDINGS.

Congress finds that the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran surveils, harasses, terrorizes, tortures, abducts, and murders individuals who peacefully defend human rights and freedoms in Iran, and innocent entities and individuals considered by the Government of Iran to be enemies of that regime, including United States citizens on United States soil, and takes foreign nationals hostage, including in the following instances:

(1) In 2021, Iranian intelligence agents were indicted for plotting to kidnap United States citizen, women's rights activist, and journalist Masih Alinejad, from her home in New York City, in retaliation for exercising her rights under the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Iranian agents allegedly spent at least approximately half a million dollars to capture the outspoken critic of the authoritarianism of the Government of Iran, and studied evacuating her by military-style speedboats to Venezuela before rendition to Iran.

(2) Prior to the New York kidnapping plot, Ms. Alinejad's family in Iran was instructed by authorities to lure Ms. Alinejad to Turkey. In an attempt to intimidate her into silence, the Government of Iran arrested 3 of Ms. Alinejad's family members in 2019, and sentenced her brother to 8 years in prison for refusing to denounce her.

(3) According to Federal prosecutors, the same Iranian intelligence network that allegedly plotted to kidnap Ms. Alinejad is also targeting critics of the Government of Iran who live in Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United Arab Emirates.

(4) In 2021, an Iranian diplomat was convicted in Belgium of attempting to carry out a 2018 bombing of a dissident rally in France.

(5) In 2021, a Danish high court found a Norwegian citizen of Iranian descent guilty of illegal espionage and complicity in a failed plot to kill an Iranian Arab dissident figure in Denmark.

(6) In 2021, the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) appealed to the United Nations to protect BBC Persian employees in London who suffer regular harassment and threats of kidnapping by Iranian government agents.

(7) In 2021, 15 militants allegedly working on behalf of the Government of Iran were arrested in Ethiopia for plotting to attack citizens of Israel, the United States, and the United Arab Emirates, according to United States officials.

(8) In 2020, Iranian agents allegedly kidnapped United States resident and Iranian-German journalist Jamshid Sharmahd, while he was traveling to India through Dubai. Iranian authorities announced they had seized Mr. Sharmahd in “a complex operation”, and paraded him blindfolded on state television. Mr. Sharmahd is arbitrarily detained in Iran, allegedly facing the death penalty. In 2009, Mr. Sharmahd was the target of an alleged Iran-directed assassination plot in Glendora, California.

(9) In 2020, the Government of Turkey released counterterrorism files exposing how Iranian authorities allegedly collaborated with drug gangs to kidnap Habib Chabi, an Iranian-Swedish activist for Iran's Arab minority. In 2020, the Government of Iran allegedly lured Mr. Chabi to Istanbul through a female agent posing as a potential lover. Mr. Chabi was then allegedly kidnapped from